Published: 14th of March 2026 by Patrick Carpen
Last updated: March 14, 2026 at 9:29 amSome people are saying that with Maduro gone, the threat of Venezuela annexing the Essequibo is still at large. Let’s examine this a little bit….
The border controversy between Guyana and Venezuela is one of the longest-running territorial disputes in the Western Hemisphere, dating back to the 19th century. Venezuela reopened the border controversy just around the time when Guyana was transitioning to Independence in the 1960s. However, the motive for doing so remains unclear, and Venezuela’s resolve to forcefully annex the territory seemed extremely weak until 2023. For decades, the dispute existed primarily on diplomatic letterhead with occasional rhetorical flourishes but little concrete action.
What many observers overlook is the tangible evidence of genuine bilateral cooperation that existed between the two nations well into the 21st century. In 2013, the Hugo Chavez Rehabilitation Centre, a US$2 million project funded by the Venezuelan government, opened its doors in Guyana. This state-of-the-art facility at Onverwagt, West Coast Berbice, was designed to house 100 males and 80 females, providing rehabilitation services for some of Guyana’s most vulnerable citizens. At the commissioning ceremony, President Donald Ramotar praised the late Venezuelan leader’s “great humanity” and his commitment to helping the poor and disadvantaged, not just in Venezuela but across the region. The Venezuelan ambassador described the project as a symbol of her country’s compassion and commitment. No enemy state funds a US$2 million social project for the adversary. Furthermore, Guyana had long benefited from the PetroCaribe initiative, which provided subsidized Venezuelan fuel in exchange for rice exports, creating genuine economic interdependence.
So why all the noise in 2023? The answer lies in Caracas, not Georgetown. Nicolas Maduro was under immense political pressure. His government faced international sanctions, economic collapse, and eroding domestic support. He was at risk of being voted out in an election that many believed he could not fairly win. Activating nationalist sentiment and saber-rattling over the Essequibo would serve a classic authoritarian purpose: distracting the population from the regime’s atrocities and failures at home. That’s how tyrants stay in power, by distraction, confusion, and war. The December 2023 referendum, in which over 95% of voters supposedly supported annexation, was never a genuine expression of popular will but a carefully staged piece of political theater.
Despite building military infrastructure and making grandiose announcements—ordering state companies to exploit oil and gas in the disputed territory, presenting new maps showing the Essequibo as Venezuelan territory, and mobilizing troops to the border—Maduro’s willingness to actually enter Guyana by force remained questionable. The military analysis bears this out. While Venezuela possesses a formidable arsenal, including Russian-made Sukhoi fighter jets and advanced anti-aircraft systems, the practical ability to project power into the Essequibo’s dense jungle terrain is severely limited. The border region is largely impenetrable to armored operations, and any amphibious or airborne assault would face enormous logistical challenges without Brazilian cooperation—something that was never forthcoming.
Opposition leaders in Venezuela have also touted military control over the Essequibo to score cheap political points, but they are unlikely to act on those promises once elected. Nationalism sells in Venezuelan politics, but governing a failed state requires different priorities. Yes, there are a few fringe groups that push for forcible takeover of the Essequibo, but their support base is extremely weak and disconnected from the reality of Venezuela’s profound domestic crises.
The international legal framework continues to strengthen Guyana’s position. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed its jurisdiction over the case in December 2020 and is now moving toward a final resolution. The court is expected to begin hearings on the merits in May 2026 with a binding judgment to follow. Venezuela has filed its rejoinder, completing the written phase of proceedings, and all indications suggest the court will rule in Guyana’s favor, recognizing the validity of the 1899 Arbitral Award that established the current boundary. This will make it even more difficult for Venezuela to claim the Essequibo, as the full weight of international law and the UN Charter will stand against any revisionist ambitions.
Importantly, the December 2023 meeting between Presidents Irfaan Ali and Nicolas Maduro in St. Vincent and the Grenadines produced a joint declaration in which both parties agreed “not to threaten or use force against one another in any circumstances” and committed to resolving disputes in accordance with international law. CARICOM, Brazil, the UN, and other regional actors remain actively engaged in ensuring this commitment holds.
The prospect of a Venezuelan takeover of the Essequibo has always been slim, and with each passing day, it gets slimmer. The combination of international legal proceedings, regional diplomatic pressure, Brazil’s strategic presence, Guyana’s growing economic partnerships (including with major powers like the United States), and Venezuela’s continued internal weakness makes military action increasingly implausible. In my opinion, it’s never going to happen and it’s nothing to worry about. The Essequibo is Guyanese, will remain Guyanese, and the international community has made that clear.
